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Abstract
Many of our daily activities are supported by behavioural goals that guide the selection of actions, which allow us to reach these goals
effectively. Goals are considered to be important for action observation since they allow the observer to copy the goal of the action without the
need to use the exact same means. The importance of being able to use different action means becomes evident when the observer and observed
actor have different bodies (robots and humans) or bodily measurements (parents and children), or when the environments of actor and observer
differ substantially (when an obstacle is present or absent in either environment). A selective focus on the action goals instead of the action means
furthermore circumvents the need to consider the vantage point of the actor, which is consistent with recent findings that people prefer to represent
the actions of others from their own individual perspective. In this paper, we use a computational approach to investigate how knowledge about
action goals and means are used in action observation. We hypothesise that in action observation human agents are primarily interested in
identifying the goals of the observed actor’s behaviour. Behavioural cues (e.g. the way an object is grasped) may help to disambiguate the goal of
the actor (e.g. whether a cup is grasped for drinking or handing it over). Recent advances in cognitive neuroscience are cited in support of the
model’s architecture.
q 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Many of our activities in daily life involve some form of
cooperation with another person, for example, carrying an
object together or holding a cup so that the other can pour in a
drink. These joint actions not only require coordinating each
others actions at the motor control level (e.g. Burstedt, Edin, &
Johansson, 1997), but also incorporating the actions of others
in the planning of one’s own actions. To do this, the other’s
actions must first be recognised. Central to the issue of action
observation is the question of how an observed action can be
linked to the observer’s own actions. There are two main
theories of how this could work in humans. According to
‘theory of mind’ humans are able to recognise another’s actions
because they possess a common sense model of human
behaviour (Frith & Frith, 1999; Gre`zes, Frith & Passingham,
2004). According to ‘simulation theory’ the observer simulates0893-6080/$ - see front matter q 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.neunet.2006.02.004
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E-mail address: r.cuijpers@nici.ru.nl (R.H. Cuijpers).what the other is doing by using her/his own action system
(Goldman, 1992).
The discovery of ‘mirror neurons’ showed that the action
system is indeed involved in action observation (Gallese and
Goldman, 1998). Mirror neurons have the interesting property
of firing selectively both during observation and execution of
goal-directed actions (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001;
Iacoboni, Moinar-Szakacs, Gallese, Buccino, Mazziotta &
Rizzolatti, 2005). Brass, Bekkering, and Prinz (2001) have
found that actions are initiated more quickly when observing a
congruent action than an incongruent action. This finding also
suggests that the action system is involved in action
observation.
Action observation also plays a crucial role in imitation
learning, which is a major topic in robotics (e.g. Breazeal,
Buchsbaum, Gray, Gatenby, & Blumberg, 2005; Schaal,
Peters, Nakanishi, & Ijspeert, 2004; for an overview see
Schaal, 1999). A commonly used technique is a direct mapping
of observed joint angles onto a set of learned action primitives
in order to associate actions of the self to observed actions
(Schaal, 2003). However, such an approach can only work
when the bodies of the observed agent and the observer are
similar. For humans this assumption is not very realistic not
only because the relative lengths of the limbs may differ (adultsNeural Networks 19 (2006) 311–322www.elsevier.com/locate/neunet
Fig. 1. Part of a building plan in a construction task.
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action goals of highly dissimilar bodies. For example, when an
octopus grasps an object with one of its arms (Yekutieli,
Sagiv-Zohar, Aharonov, Engel, Hochner, & Flash, 2005;
Yekutieli, Sagiv-Zohar, Hochner & Flash, 2005), observers
are still able to infer the target of the movement.
Bekkering, Wohlschla¨ger, and Gattis (2000) have argued
that the goals of an action are more important in imitation—
and in action observation in general—than the means with
which the particular goals are being accomplished. Van Schie,
Mars, Coles, and Bekkering (2004) found that observation of
left and right hand movements of a facing actor activated motor
areas contra-lateral to the side of the observed action
(corresponding to the ipsi-lateral hand). Thus, the observer’s
brain activation reflects what the observer would have done if
he/she had actively performed the action, instead of represent-
ing the task from the perspective of the actor. Neurophysio-
logical evidence suggest that the intentions of observed actions
are also important during action observation: the activity of
mirror neurons of the macaque monkey (Fogassi, Ferrari
Gesierich, Rozzi, Chersi, & Rizzolatti, 2005; Rizzolatti et al.,
2001) and the human brain (Iacoboni et al., 2005) are
modulated by the intentions associated to the observed actions.
Inferring the goal of an action has substantial advantages over
simply mapping the means of an action directly onto the
observer’s motor repertoire. First, goal inference can overcome
large differences in bodily measures (Calinon, Guenter, &
Billard, 2005). Second, it also allows the observer to use
different means for achieving an action goal than the agent
being observed (Erlhagen, Mukovskiy, Bicho, Panin, Kiss,
Knoll, Van Shie, & Bekkering, in press).
Recently, Oztop, Wolpert, and Kawato (2004) have
proposed a computational model of action observation. In
their model the observed movement trajectory is extrapolated
into the future using forward modelling of a hypothesised
action. The hypothesised action that yields the best prediction
is interpreted as equivalent to the observed action. It is assumed
that forward modelling can be used to predict the movements
of another person, which is very different from predicting
proprioceptive feedback (afferent signal) of self-produced
movements. This is problematic for several reasons. For one,
it is not clear how such an approach is able to deal with the
different vantage points of observer and actor. Another key
issue is the amount of time that may be anticipated. In joint
action it is very useful to know what the other is doing ahead of
time in order to respond adequately. Many studies have shown
that humans are indeed capable of anticipating another’s
behaviour (e.g. Flanagan & Johansson, 2003; Knoblich &
Jordan, 2003; Wilson & Knoblich, 2005). When co-ordinating
each other’s actions the time spans involved can be quite large
(a single reaching movement typically lasts between 0.5–2.0 s
and manipulation of several objects lasts even longer). Forward
modelling may work well to get rid of internal delays (Mehta &
Schaal, 2002) but it is unlikely that large time spans can be
reliably covered that way, which leads to noisy results (see
Figs. 5 and 6 in Oztop et al., 2004). Critically, these problems
may be circumvented by inferring the goal of an action ratherthan the action itself: action goals are not view-point dependent
and they cover sufficiently large time spans because an action
goal is the end result of an action.
Unfortunately, action goals are not directly observable. In
most situations accurate inferences regarding action goals require
additional knowledge. For example, when observing another
person, themovement kinematics only contain information about
the intended location. To infer the goal of an observedmovement
it is necessary to use information about the potential goals,
which the observer may have acquired earlier.
In this paper, we present a computational model of how the
goal of an action may be inferred from action observation. We
focus on how knowledge about the task, the environment and
the observer’s action repertoire are being used to make these
inferences. To do so we use a Bayesian framework because it
allows us to separate prior knowledge from the information that
is directly observable. In the process we indicate how the
observer’s personal preferences can disambiguate the goal
inference at the cost of introducing a bias to the observer’s
preferred action goal.2. Model architecture: the construction task
We illustrate the model architecture by means of a
construction task, where a model has to be built from a
collection of elementary components consisting of nuts, bolts,
slats, etc. (Fig. 1). In order to perform such a task, knowledge is
required about what one can do with the components. This
includes the specific actions that must be accomplished, as well
Fig. 2. (A) Every action alternative Ak corresponds to a unique transition i/jm,
but the converse is not true. (B) Each action alternative Ak requires several
components cl indicated by the circles. On the other hand, each component cl
may be used for different action alternatives. For example, c1 belongs to both A2
and A3.
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what and the how. The knowledge about how acts need to be
performed and what they accomplish is, in principle, available
from prior experiences (we do not consider learning). In
particular, there is some action repertoire with which the
components may be manipulated. For each of those actions, it
is known which components are needed and what the result of
performing that action is. On the other hand, the knowledge
about what needs to be done is not present a priori and is
obtained from studying the building plan (Fig. 1). In the most
extreme case, the building plan is nothing more than a picture
of the completed model and the actions to undertake must
somehow be deduced from this picture. Because of the large
number of combinations with which the components may be
assembled, the person building the model needs to make a
number of choices without being certain that they will lead to
the desired final result. This uncertainty arises from the fact
that one can only reliably ‘predict’ the result of a few
construction steps. Thus, one must evaluate, in some way,
which of all possibilities most likely leads to the desired final
construction. Our conjecture is that such evaluations are coarse
or even ambiguous and that any choice is biased by the
preferences of the person building the model.
When co-operatively building a model, the actions of the
co-actor should be taken into account because they influence
what the best course of action is. We assume that inferences
about the co-actor’s actions take place at the action goal level.
This allows anticipation of the co-actor’s behaviour over much
larger time spans. However, inferring an action goal is only
possible if the observations are combined with knowledge
about the task, because the observations do not contain
information about the action goals themselves. This still leaves
open the questions what an action goal is, and how it is
represented in the human brain. Although these questions are
beyond the scope of the current paper, any representation of
action goals should be independent of the means with which
the action goals are being achieved. In other words, it is the end
result that counts. We use a transition between states of the
world stZi/stC1Zj to represent action goals. For example, in
the construction task the action goal is completely determined
by the initial state (the unassembled components) and the state
after performing the corresponding action (the assembled set of
components). The advantage of this representation is that it
does not depend on the vantage point of the observer, so,
ideally, it is equivalent for each observer. The states of the
world can never be represented internally in their full
complexity. Fortunately, most of their parameters do not
change or they change in a way that is irrelevant for a given
task. In addition, many relevant parameters do not need a
sustained internal representation but are available through
observation. For example, the locations of objects may be
observed directly and they do not need to be memorised with
high accuracy.
In the construction task the number of components is limited
and so is the number of ways in which they may be combined.
Therefore, the number of action goals is also limited and we
can arbitrarily assign a number i to them. This does not meanthat the number of actions, which are performed to accomplish
these goals, are limited. However, human movements tend to
be stereotypical for any given task in the sense that the
movement kinematics are similar (Desmurget, Pe´lisson,
Rossetti, & Prablanc, 1998) and that the employed end
postures are similar despite the large number of degrees of
freedom of the motor system (Gre´a, Desmurget, & Prablanc,
2000). Also, the variability in end posture is small compared to
the variability during the movement (Harris & Wolpert, 1998).
Such observations have been explained by assuming that
movements are generated using a limited set of primitives
(Thoroughman & Shadmehr, 2000; Rosenbaum, Meulenbroek,
Vaughan, & Jansen, 2001). This is also supported by the fact
that canonical neurons and mirror neurons in the premotor
areas of the macaque monkey brain (Fogassi et al., 2005) and
human brain (Gangitano, Mottaghy, & Pascual-Leone, 2004)
are selectively sensitive to particular action sequences.
Certainly, this assumption decreases the computational load
considerably making it popular in robotics (e.g. Paine & Tani,
2004). Thus, it seems that humans are capable of only a limited
number of actions at a given time and that we can distinguish
them in terms of the action goals they achieve. In our
formalism we define a set of action alternatives AtZ
fA1;.; AKg such that the result of each action is a new state
of the world (Ak:st/stC1) as illustrated in Fig. 2A. We use the
term action alternative rather than action primitive because we
think of each action alternative as being some composition of
action primitives. The action alternative ‘screw bolt c1 in nut
c02, for instance, involves several grasping, holding, orienting
and twisting movements. It is conceivable that different action
alternatives entail the same change of states. For example, an
object may be grasped using a precision grip (using the tips of
thumb and index finger only) or a full grip. We regard action
alternatives as different when the means with which a certain
action goal is being achieved differ. In the construction task the
relevant dimensions of the state of the world are determined by
the set of components CtZ fc1;.; cNg, where each component
is some aggregate of the elementary building blocks. Note that
each action alternative represents a ‘move’ from one collection
of components to another. As such, the action alternatives
define a Markov process (Sutton & Barto, 1998). Suppose A1 is
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2, then A1
transforms fc1; c2;.; cNg/ f!c1; c2O; c3;.cNg where !c1,
c2O denotes the newly assembled piece. Clearly, the new piece
can only be assembled if c1 is a bolt and c2 is a nut, otherwise
the assembly fails and the ‘new’ state of the world is identical
to the previous one. We denote the subset of components on
which the action alternative Ak is applicable by Ck (Fig. 2B).2.1. Action observation
When observing an elephant grasping a peanut with its
trunk, it is clear that the means used to grasp the peanut cannot
be directly represented by the action repertoire of a human
observer. If we do not wish to assume that the observer has
knowledge about the action repertoire of an observed actor, the
best an observer can do is to anticipate the action goal itself.
However, the action goals are not directly observable. For
example, when the goal is ‘screw the red bolt in the blue nut’,
the observed motor act could be a reaching movement towards
the red bolt (Fig. 3). Observations of the movement kinematics
contain information about the target well before it is reached
(Cuijpers, Smeets, & Brenner, 2004), so that the observer may
anticipate the target of the movement. Whether the inferred
target is the actual target of the movement is uncertain because
of perceptual uncertainties and distractors in a cluttered
environment. Many studies have shown that humans take
into account these uncertainties and often combine them in aFig. 3. Action planning and action observation. The actor (left side) has decided
to screw the red bolt (c2) in the blue nut (c3) and reaches for the red bolt. The
observer (right side) observes the locations of hand ððxEÞ and targets ððxiÞ, and the
speed of the actor’s hand ð _ðxEÞ. The action goal is inferred using prior
knowledge about the potential goals p(i/jm) and which components are
involved in each action goal p(cnji/jm).statistically optimal way (Ernst & Bu¨lthoff, 2004; Trommer-
sha¨user, Gepshtein, Maloney, Landy, & Banks, 2005). This can
be modelled by defining the likelihood that the ‘evidence’ from
observations occurs given the hypothesised target of the
movement (denoted by p(otjcn) in Fig. 3). In order to obtain
the target likelihood, Oztop et al. (2004) have proposed to use
forward modelling of the hypothesised action to predict the
perceptual consequences of future states of the motor system.
Only the correct hypothesis will yield good agreement with
subsequent observations and, thus, single out the correct action
alternative. If knowledge about the task is available, the future
states are known in advance because the potential targets are
known. This can be used to define the target likelihood directly.
Consequently, the target likelihood depends on some distance
measure between the location (and velocity) of the actor’s
effector and those of the potential targets.
The target likelihood still does not uniquely determine the
action goal. However, if the observer knows which targets are
manipulated by each of her/his own action alternatives, it is
possible to associate the target likelihood to the observer’s
action alternatives (Fig. 2B). Note that the action alternatives,
which are associated to the target likelihood in this way, may
represent means that are completely different from the
observed movement. Observations may provide information
about the target of a movement, but not about what the target
object will be used for. Thus, in order to infer the action goal
prior knowledge is required, either about the person performing
the task (‘she always combines red with blue objects’) or about
the desired final state. In joint action, the latter is known
because it is common to all participants cooperating in a joint
task. We model these personal interpretations by introducing a
probability distribution p(i/j) over the action goals i/j. This
distribution is the result of action planning in an earlier stage
(discussed below). Fig. 3 illustrates an example of action
observation in the construction task. Both the red bolt and the
green nut assign a high likelihood to the ‘evidence’ from
observation as they are both in the direction of movement. But
if the observer has knowledge about which action goals lead to
the desired final state, the correct action goal may be inferred.
2.2. Planning action goals
When performing a task, typically a sequence of action
alternatives need to be executed in order to reach the desired
final state. For example, when making coffee, the filter must be
placed in the coffee maker before the coffee itself. Typically,
two types of errors have been observed in neurological
patients: sequence errors (the coffee is put in the coffee
maker before the filter) and substitution errors (sugar is put in
the filter instead of coffee). In the construction task similar
mistakes may occur but the situation is more complicated,
because the number of ways in which the components may be
combined can be much larger. Moreover, it is not immediately
clear which of all possibilities will lead to the desired final
state—a completed model. Clearly, a brute force search
through the entire state space is not the solution, because of
the combinatorial explosion of possibilities and because it is
R.H. Cuijpers et al. / Neural Networks 19 (2006) 311–322 315unlikely that the entire state space is known. There are plenty of
examples such as making a jig saw puzzle of 1000 pieces.
Therefore, we use an evaluation function to model the
knowledge about which action goals lead to the desired final
state (also called heuristic or utility function). The evaluation
function defines an ordering in the state space. This ordering
circumvents the need to search the entire state space because it
allows one to judge whether one state is ‘in the direction of’ the
desired final state or not. The evaluation value is not
necessarily unique for each configuration of components:
there are more ways to reach the final state. In that case, the
personal preferences can disambiguate any decision. We model
these personal preferences by a probability distribution p(i/j)
over the action goals i/j. By weighing the personal
preferences with the evaluation function we obtain a
distribution over the action goals conditional on the final
state f.2.3. Selecting action alternatives
Based on the distribution over the action goals a decision
can be made about which action goal to choose. However, there
may be more than one action alternative that accomplishes this
goal. Again, additional knowledge is required to choose the
best alternative. There may be both internal and external
reasons to choose one action alternative over another. For
example, if one wishes to drink from a cup it is convenient to
grasp it by the handle (internal constraint) but only when the
cup has a handle (external constraint). These constraints lead to
graded preferences of the action alternatives, which we model
by a probability distribution over the action alternatives p(Akji).
Of all action alternatives that lead to the desired final state, the
preferred one is chosen.3. Model details
3.1. Definitions
1. st: state of the world at time t that is identified with a unique
number i2N.
2. ot: vector of observables during action observation.
3. CtZ fc1;.; cNg: set of components, where each component
cn is either a building block or an aggregate of building
blocks.
4. AtZ fA1;.; AKg: set of action alternatives at time t, where
each action alternative involves a state transition (Ak:st/
stC1).
5. Ck4Ct: subset of all available components that are
associated to action alternative Ak.
6. Vf(st): evaluation function associating a value to each state
of the world st when the desired state is sNZf.
7. kijZ fkjAkðiÞZ j; Ak2Atg list of indices of the action
alternatives Ak which result in the same state stC1Zj given
the current state stZi.
8. lkZ fljcl2Ck; Ck4Ctg list of indices of components cn
that are associated to action alternative Ak.9. rlij: reward during action observation for inferring state
stC1Zj when it turns out to be stC1Zl.3.2. Action observation
The action goal is represented by a state change from stZi
to stC1Zj, in short denoted i/j. To infer the action goal of an
observed action we assign a probability distribution over the
possible state changes for a given set of observations ot and a
desired final state f:
pði/ jjf ; otÞZ pðstC1Z jjstZ i; f ; otÞ
fpðotjstZ i; stC1Z j; f ÞpðstC1Z jjstZ i; f Þ
(1)
pði/ jjf ; otÞZ pðotji/ jÞpði/ jjf Þ: (2)
Here, we have used Bayes rule to invert the conditional
probability. The first term on the right hand side of Eq. 1
denotes the likelihood that the observed data occurs for a given
state change from i/j. Formally, this term is conditional on
the final state f, but since the observations usually only contain
information about the state change from i/j, we may assume
that the observations are independent of f (Eq. (2)). The second
term is the prior distribution representing the goal preferences
of the observer. On the other hand, if the observer has an action
plan of his own, the probability will be larger for those i/j
conforming to the action plan that leads to the desired final
state f. Therefore, this probability is conditional on the final
state f.
During action observation (Fig. 4A) the state stC1Zj in Eq.
(1) is the hypothesised result of the observed action. Since, the
observed action may not exist in the observer’s own action
repertoire, we assign a likelihood distribution p(otjAk,i/j)
over the observer’s own action alternatives that result in the
same state (Ak(i)Zj). This distribution denotes the likelihood
that the observations ot occur when the observer would perform
action Ak. The likelihood is high whenever the observer’s own
action alternatives match the observed action. The likelihood
distribution represents the observed action. It is related to the
likelihood distribution across action goals in Eq. (2) by:
pðotji/ jÞZ
X
k2kij
pðotjAk; i/ jÞpðAkji/ jÞ; (3)
where kijZ fkjAkðiÞZ j; Ak2Atg. The second term on the right
hand side of Eq. (3) denotes the prior distribution reflecting the
observer’s preferences for the various action alternatives.
In the construction task each action alternative applies to a
subset of the components Ct, denoted by the subset Ck. Let
lkZ fljcl2Ck; Ck4Ctg, then we can write:
pðotjAk; i/ jÞZ
X
l2lk
pðotjcl; Ak; i/ jÞpðcljAk; i/ jÞ: (4)
The second term on the right hand side of Eq. (4) is the
probability that component cl is the target of the movement
when the actor intends to reach state j using action alternative
Fig. 4. Schematic representation of action observation (A) and action planning (B) indicating how task knowledge and personal preferences are combined.
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component but only if it is actually used by action alternative
Ak (Fig. 2B):
pðcljAk; i/ jÞZ
pðcljiÞP
n2lk pðcnjiÞ
if l2lkok2kij
0 otherwise
:
8><
>: (5)
The probability p(clji) indicates which component is
preferred. These target preferences are conditional on the
current state i because they could depend on the colour of the
components, for instance, or on their distance from the actor’s
hand.
The first term on the right hand side of Eq. (4) is the
likelihood that the observed movement is directed towards
component cl and that the means are consistent with action
alternative Ak. This does not mean that the means of the
observed action need to be in the observer’s action repertoire,
but the inference process will be better if they are. In order to
find an expression for this target likelihood we need to specify
what the observations ot of the movement kinematics are. For
simplicity we will only consider the locations and velocities of
the effector ððxEðtÞÞ of the observed actor and those of the
components ððxnðtÞÞ. These observables carry information about
which component will be manipulated but not about the means
with which the component will be grasped. In that case it would
be necessary to consider the locations and velocities of at least
two effectors (e.g. the fingertips). We use the fact that the
relative velocity between effector and target decreases with the
distance from the target. Therefore, we introduce the following
observable:
otZ dnðtÞCt _dnðtÞ; (6)
where t is some constant and dn(t) denotes the distance
between effector and component, defined by:
dnðtÞZ jðxnðtÞKðxEðtÞj (7)
We define the likelihood that the component cn is the target
of the movement as:pðotjcn; Ak; i/ jÞ
Z
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2ps2
p expKðdnðtÞCt
_dnðtÞÞ2
2s2
if l2lkok2kij
0 otherwise
;
8><
>:
(8)
where s denotes the uncertainty. The likelihood is maximal
when the effector is at the target after t seconds. The constant t
can also be viewed as determining the relative contribution of
the velocity information. Since the relative velocity decreases
to zero as the effector approaches the actual target, the
likelihood is high when the distance is decreasing. However, if
the distance is decreasing too rapidly, the likelihood is small
because it is likely that the effector will overshoot the target
component. The form of Eq. (6) is rather arbitrary and many
other definitions are possible. Clearly, the more knowledge
about movement kinematics is incorporated, the better the
target inference will be.3.3. Making a decision
Thus far, we have only considered distributions, which
assign likelihoods to either the action goals or the action
alternatives. At some point a decision must be made in order to
perform an action. A decision about which action goal to
undertake may be achieved by maximising the reward that is
obtained for inferring the correct action goal. We use the Bayes
rule which maximises the expected reward with respect to the
posterior distribution given by Eq. (2) when anticipating an
action goal. We have:
janticipatedZ arg max
j
X
l
rlijpði/ jjf ; otÞ; (9)
where rlij is the reward for choosing j when l was the correct
choice. A very simple reward function suitable for our purposes
is:
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1 if jZ l
0 if jsl
:
(
(10)
Then Eq. (9) reduces to:
janticipatedZ arg max
j
pði/ jjf ; otÞ: (11)
Eq. (11) shows what the most likely action alternative is
given some observations and a desired final state, but since
observations change over time so does the planned action. The
question then is when to make a decision. A decision may then
be made when the likelihood p(i/janticipatedjf,ot) exceeds some
predetermined level. If we take for this level a value
proportional to the likelihood of the second best action goal
jsecondbest, a decision is reached when
pði/ janticipatedjf ; otÞOapði/ jsecondbestjf ; otÞ; (12)
where a is some predetermined likelihood ratio.3.4. Planning action goals
The planning of an action goal (Fig. 4B) without knowledge
about the desired final state can only occur on the basis of some
personal preferences. If the desired final state is known,
the suitability of each action goal should be evaluated first. The
personal preferences may still bias the results. We write for the
second term on the right hand side of Eq. (1):
pði/ jjf ÞfVf ðjÞpði/ jÞ; (13)
where p(i/j) are the action goal preferences and Vf(j) is the
evaluation function denoting the value of state stC1Zj when
the ultimate goal is to reach final state f. For the construction
task such an evaluation function could be the ratio between the
number of correctly assembled components (not counting
elementary components) to the square of the total number of
components. This function is 0 when there are only elementary
parts and 1 when all elementary parts are used in the completed
model. This evaluation function does not associate unique
values to each action goal because multiple alternatives may
lead to the same action goal. In that case the personal
preferences can bias the observer in favour of one action goal
over another.
The second term of Eq. (13) indicates the action goal
preferences. Since each action alternative uniquely determines
the action goal i/j, the action goal preferences are related to
the action alternative preferences in the following way
pði/ jÞZ pðstC1Z jjstZ iÞZ
X
k2kij
pðAkjiÞ; (14)
where kijZ fkjAkðiÞZ j; Ak2Atg.
During action observation the anticipated goal of the
observed actor may be used to plan a response. The observer
simply plans an action goal using the anticipated state of the
world instead of the current state:pðstC2Z jresponsejstZ i; f ; otÞZ pðstC2Z jresponsejstC1
Z janticipated; f Þ: (15)
The planned response depends only on stZi because we
assume that the probability of a state only depends on the
previous state and not the state before that (Markov
assumption). This simplification could be relaxed, if necessary.
The right hand side of Eq. (15) is given by Eq. (13) with the
current state i replaced by the anticipated state janticipated.3.5. Planning action alternatives
Suppose the desired next state of the world is stC1Zj when
the current state is stZi. The action alternatives that
accomplish this task are those Ak for which k2kij. The
personal preferences p(Akji) differentiate between these actions
alternatives. The preference for an action alternative given the
action goal i/j is:
pðAkji/ jÞZ
pðAkjiÞP
l2kij pðAljiÞ
if k2kij
0 otherwise
:
8><
>: (16)
If there are no action alternatives that correspond to a
transition from i/j, the probability is zero.
In order to know what the desired action alternative is,
we need to evaluate which of all possible states is most
desirable. The desired state j has a likelihood given by Eq. (13),
so that:
pðAkjstZ i; f ÞZ pðAkjstZ i; stC1Z j; f ÞpðstC1Z jjst
Z i; f ÞZ pðAkji/ jÞpði/ jjf Þ; (17)
where jZAk(i) is the state that results from action
alternative Ak. In Eq. (17) we have used that the probability
of an action alternative Ak for a given transition from i/j is
independent of the desired final state f.4. Implementation for the construction task
So far, our model is phrased in rather abstract terms. This
was done on purpose so that the model is flexible enough. For
example, there are not many requirements on the action
repertoire apart from the requirement that they cause
transitions between states of the world st by changing some
set of components ct in some way. However, as soon as the
action repertoire has been determined most other quantities are
fixed as well. The only quantities that can still be freely chosen
are the personal preferences p(cnji), p(Akji) and the evaluation
function Vf(st).
In order to implement our model to any particular task we
need to define precisely what we mean by action alternatives,
action goals and the states of the world. Any quantitative
predictions will depend for a large part on these definitions.
Moreover, the various model parameters need to be (exper-
imentally) determined first. This is not the aim of the current
R.H. Cuijpers et al. / Neural Networks 19 (2006) 311–322318paper. Instead, we look for some more qualitative predictions
that are experimentally testable. We do this by implementing
our model to the following scenario: two people need to
construct a model using Baufix building blocks. One person
(the actor) builds the model and the other person (the observer)
assists by pointing to (or handing over) the next, required
building block as soon as possible. With this scenario we could
measure the observer’s reaction time and choices and compare
the behaviour to our model.Fig. 5. Pseudo code for action observation.4.1. Choosing the action repertoire
In order to implement our model to the construction task we
must first define the observer’s knowledge about the world and
her/his action repertoire. As an example we use a ’world’ with
five elementary components: two bolts c1 and c2, two nuts c3
and c4 and a three-holed slat c5 (see Fig. 6A). Next, we need to
choose the action repertoire of the observer, because that will
determine the action alternatives and the potential new states of
the world (and therefore the action goals). We define three
actions all of which combine two components into a single new
component:
1. Put bolt X through hole of component Y
2. Screw nut X on bolt Y
3. Place nut X in front of hole of component Y
Clearly, the first action is only possible if the component X
is a bolt and component Y has a hole through which the bolt can
be put. Since there are two bolts, there are two possible
alternatives to choose from. In addition, each bolt can be put in
a hole from two directions and the component Y may posses
more than one hole, so that there are 12 possible alternatives for
action 1. Similar considerations apply to actions 2 and 3. If we
wish to distinguish between all these new states of the world,
we need to consider all action alternatives. For simplicity we
fix the direction to ’from above’ for action 1 (’from below’ for
action 3) and ignore the number of holes (always choose the
first hole). Then we obtain eight different action alternatives Ak
(two for action 1, four for action 2 and two for action 3). Each
action alternative operates on a different pair of components
Ck4Ct.
The action alternatives determine the number of potential
new states stC1Zj of the world and their associated action
goals i/j. In our simple example there are only three possible
new states (j1: ’bolt put through hole 1 of slat from above’, j2:
’bolt screwed in nut’ and j3: ’nut attached to hole 1 of slat from
below’). If the desired final state f is known, the potential new
states can be evaluated using the evaluation function Vf(j). For
our example, we define the final state f as a slat with equally
directed bolts through the first two holes that are fixed in place
with two nuts (similar to the cabin of the locomotive in Fig. 1).
We have captured the knowledge about the construction
task and the possible actions that may be performed given the
current state of the world, but we still need to set the personal
preferences for the components (p(cnji)), the action alternatives
(p(Akji)) and the action goals (p(i/j)). The latter follow fromEq. 14. This leaves 11 free parameters in our example (5
components and 8 action alternatives minus 2 because the
probabilities have to add up to 1). The role of these preferences
will be discussed later. For now we use the unbiased situation
where all components and all action alternatives are equally
preferred.
Now that both the knowledge about the construction task
and the personal preferences are known the action goal may be
inferred from an observed movement (see Fig. 4A). Eq. (8)
gives the likelihood of the observations and action goal
likelihood is inferred using Eqs. (2)–(5) and Eq. (13). If the
ratio between the most likely and second most likely action
goal exceeds a threshold a, a decision is made and a response
can be initiated. Otherwise, a new observation is made and the
process iterates. In Fig. 5 the entire procedure for inferring the
action goal from an observed movement is summarised in the
form of pseudo code.4.2. Action goal inference as a function of movement time
In Fig. 6A a potential scenario is shown of how the action
goal may be inferred during action observation. In this
simulation the observed actor moves in a straight line towards
component c1. The movement velocity was taken from the
tangential velocity of a real grasping movement (see Cuijpers
et al., 2004). The movement velocity is bell-shaped function of
time, so that the hand was almost stationary in the first and last
20% of the movement. The movement time is typically 1 s and
is approximately independent of the distance of the target.
During observation of the movement the observable ot given by
Eq. (6) changes as the movement unfolds. To determine an
appropriate value for twe plotted the rate of change of distance
_d as a function of the distance d for each target (Fig. 6B). In the
final approach the relation between _d and d is approximately
linear for the correct component (blue line), so that the
likelihood is maximal if the value of t is equal to the negative
of the slope (tZ0.1, black line). Using Eq. (8) and sZ0.2, we
obtain the component likelihood p(otjcn) for each component
(Fig. 6C). In the first 20% of the movement when the hand is
stationary the likelihoods are largest for components c2 and c4
because they are the nearest targets. From 20 to 40% of the
movement the hand picks up speed and the likelihood is much
larger for component c2 than for any of the other components.
From 40% of the movement and onward the correct target c1
produces the largest likelihood. This shows that the component
Fig. 6. Inferring the action goal during observation. A: scene layout of the bolts (circles), nuts (squares) and a 3-holed slat (diamond). The line indicates the
movement trajectory with a dot at every 10% of the movement time. B: rate of change of distance plotted as a function of the distance of the hand from the target. The
solid black line indicates the line dCt _dZ0, where tZ0.1. C: likelihood given each component as a function of time (in % of movement time). D: likelihood given
each action alternative as a function of time (in % of movement time). The lists of components associated to each action alternative are indicated between brackets in
the legend. E: likelihood given each action goal without using knowledge about the desired final state. The lists of action alternatives corresponding to each action
goal are indicated between brackets in the legend. F: likelihood given each action goal using knowledge about the desired final state. The vertical line indicates the
point in time where the likelihood ratio of the first and second largest likelihood exceeds the threshold aZ1.5.
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in the first part of the movement. The same applies to action
alternative likelihood given by Eq. 4 (Fig. 6D). The action
alternative likelihood for Ak is large whenever the likelihood of
one of the associated components Ck is large. In the first part of
the movement the likelihood for action alternative A6 is largest
because it combines the most likely components c2 and c4. In
the second part the likelihood of A3 is largest because it
combines the most likely components c1 and c3. Both these
action alternatives have the same action goal i/j2 (’screw nut
on bolt’), so that the likelihood for this action goal is largest
throughout the entire movement (Fig. 6E). Thus, without
knowledge about which action goal leads to the desired final
state, action goal j2 is the best choice. However, with
knowledge about the desired final state (Eq. (2)) action goal
j2 is no longer an option because the bolt needs to be put
through a hole of the slat first before screwing a nut on it. This
is shown in Fig. 6F where only the correct action goals remain
likely. The vertical, solid line indicates the point in time (about
25% of the movement time) where the likelihood ratio between
the first and second best action alternative exceeds aZ1.5
(Eq. (12)). Thus, the correct action goal has been inferred even
before the correct target of the movement could be inferred (at
about 40% of the movement time). The inferred action goal can
be used to initiate an appropriate response. For example, the
observer may assist the observed actor by handing over one of
the missing components. Although the inferred action goal j1
involves any of the components c1, c2 and c5 (through A1and A2), component c5 is the only option because the observed
movement is either directed to c1 or to c2. Because the action
goal was inferred after about 25% of the movement time, there
is still plenty of time for assisting.4.3. The role of the personal preferences
To investigate the role of the personal preferences we
created a scenario where the bolts c1 and c2 are placed
symmetrically with respect to the movement that is headed for
the slat c5 (Fig. 7A). As a result the component likelihood is
identical for the bolts c1 and c2 during the entire movement.
The same applies to the action alternatives A1 and A2 and their
associated action goal i/j1 as long as the observer is unbiased.
In Fig. 7 we show what happens to the action alternative
likelihoods (panel B) and the action goal likelihoods (panel C)
at 60% of the movement time as the preference for c1 increases
relative to the preference for c2. We keep the preferences for all
other components unbiased (p(cnji)Z1/5 for nZ3,4,5). Since
the probabilities add up to 1, we have that p(c1ji)Cp(c2ji)Z
pc0Z2/5. It can be seen that the likelihood for A1 (dashed line,
top middle panel) decreases from almost 1 to about 0.3 as the
preference p(c1ji) increases and vice versa for A2. The
likelihood for A7, which does not involve components c1 and
c2 remains unaffected. It may seem counterintuitive that the
likelihood for action alternative A1, which involves component
c1, is larger for small values of p(c1ji) than for large values. The
reason is that when p(c1ji)Z0 (and p(c2ji)Zpc0), the
Fig. 7. Effect of changing the component preferences (B, C) and the action alternative preferences (D, E, F) on the action goal inference. A: scene layout of the bolts
(circles), nuts (squares) and a 3-holed slat (diamond). The line indicates the movement trajectory towards c5 with a dot at every 10% of the movement time. B:
likelihood given each action alternative as a function of the preference p(c1ji) for component c1 under the constraint that pðc1jiÞCpðc2jiÞZpc0Z2=5. The lists of
components associated to each action alternative are indicated between brackets in the legend. C: likelihood given each action goal as a function of the preference for
component c1. The lists of action alternatives corresponding to each action goal are indicated between brackets in the legend. D: likelihood given each action goal as
a function of the preference p(A1ji) for action alternative A1 (without using knowledge about the desired final state f). The sum pðA1jiÞCpðA7jiÞZpA0Z2=8 is kept
constant. E: same as D except that knowledge about the final state f is used. F: likelihood of the planned action alternative when the inferred action goal (panel D) is
imitated.
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that c5 is the target of the movement, which happens to be the
case. Similarly, the likelihood for A2 is small because it is
mostly determined by the likelihood that c2 is the target of
movement, which is not the case. Thus, changing the
component preferences affects the weighting within each
action alternative rather than between action alternatives.
Since both action alternatives A1 and A2 are associated to the
same action goal i/j1, its likelihood is larger in the case the
component preferences are biased (Fig. 7C).
In a similar fashion, we can change the action alternative
preferences p(A1ji) and p(A7ji) under the constraint that
pðA1jiÞCpðA7jiÞZpA0Z2=8. As for the component prefer-
ences, changing the action alternative preferences will change
the relative weights within the associated action goals: if
p(A1ji)Z0 (and p(A7ji)ZpA0), the likelihood of the action goal
i/j1 is determined by A2. Since the most likely component c5
is needed for both A1 and A2, the action goal likelihood is
unaffected by our manipulation (Fig. 7D). However, the goal
preferences defined by Eq. 14 are affected: p(i/j1) increases
linearly with p(A1ji). As a result, the action goal likelihood
using knowledge about the final state f also increases linearly
(Fig. 7E). The same applies to p(i/j3) and p(A7ji). Thus, when
the observations are ambiguous about what the action goal of
the observed actor is, the personal preferences bias the action
goal likelihood towards the preferred action goal. For example,if the observer tries to imitate the action A1, the response will
be A7 rather than A1 when p(A1ji)!p(A7ji) (Fig. 7F). Even if
the inferred action goal is always correct (i/j1), the imitation
response depends on the personal preferences: the observer
imitates with A2 rather than A1 when p(A1ji)!p(A7ji). Thus,
whether or not an observer imitates an observed action with the
same action depends on the personal preferences p(Akji).
The personal preferences also affect the reaction time. If the
observer sees a movement that conforms to her/his own
preferences, the response is faster. We calculated the reaction
times for the situation depicted in Fig. 6A, while varying the
relative preferences for components c1 and c4. This is shown in
Fig. 8 where the reaction time is plotted as a function of p(c1ji)
under the constraint that pðc1jiÞCpðc4jiÞZpc0Z2=5.5. Discussion and conclusions
In our model we have described how task knowledge and
personal preferences can be combined to infer the action goal
of an observed action. Although the action system is being used
to interpret observed actions, our approach differs from
simulation theory in two important ways. First, the action
means are not being simulated and therefore they may differ
from the observed action. Second, the goal inference is done
from the observer’s perspective and not from the vantage point
of the observed actor. The observer uses her/his personal
Fig. 8. Reaction time (in % of movement time) as a function of the preference
p(c1ji) for component c1 relative to the preference p(c4ji) of c4. The sum of
these probabilities is kept constant at pc0Z2=5.
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if they differ from those of the observed agent. Although the
inference process is from a personal perspective, the
observations themselves are not. We used a viewpoint invariant
measure to infer the target location, so that it does not matter
whether the observed action is self-generated or not. The action
goals may still be represented differently by each person
because these representations are never compared directly but
only through observations of the external world. In our model
only action goals that are known to the observer can be inferred
during action observation. For example, if the observer does
not know that a cup can be used for drinking, the corresponding
action goal preference is zero, so that he or she will never infer
that the action goal is to drink from the cup. In Eq. 14 the action
alternative preferences completely determine the action goal
preferences. This expresses the situation where action goal
preferences have been learned by exploring the world using
one’s own action repertoire. If this were the only way in which
action goal preferences could be learned, the observer would be
unable to infer an action goal that the observer cannot achieve
her/himself. It is conceivable that action goals may be learned
independently from the means with which these action goals
can be achieved. In that case Eq. 14 needs to be modified to
include knowledge obtained from other sources of information
than the action system.
We used a one-dimensional distance measure as our metric
for the observations. However, in general the observations will
have more than one dimension. For example, when grasping an
object with index finger and thumb, movement direction and
hand pre-shaping variables could be estimated independently
(Cuijpers et al., 2004; Desmurget et al., 1998). For each of
these measures a goal-likelihood may be estimated, but how
are they combined? We suggest a modular approach similar to
the MOSAIC model (Wolpert & Kawato, 1998; Wolpert,
Doya, & Kawato, 2003): the likelihoods for each independent
measure are weighted and averaged according to theirresponsibility. In the MOSAIC model the responsibilities
indicate the relative importance of each measure for a given
action alternative. This allows a flexible recruitment of the
multi-dimensional observations for each action alternative.
Triesch, Ballard, Hayhoe and Sullivan (2003) found that task
relevant information is only processed when it is necessary.
Therefore, the responsibilitiesmay change over time so that they
not only determine what sources of information are necessary
but also when each source is needed.
In our model, task knowledge and personal preferences are
both internal parameters that are being used to interpret the
external sources of information. However, they are very
different entities in terms of how they change over time.
Task knowledge is more related to semantic knowledge in the
sense that it represents knowledge about how objects can be
manipulated. Although this knowledge can be learned, this
kind of learning is a long term process, which we consider fixed
for the duration of a given task. Personal preferences are, on the
other hand, conditional on the current state of the world. Thus,
they evolve over time. For example, if nearer components are
preferred over more distant components, then changing their
locations will also change the preferences. This opens up the
possibility of changing another person’s preferences and, thus,
the possibility of influencing the other’s action goal planning.
For example, a component that is out of reach of another person
may be placed in her/his vicinity so that the likelihood that this
component will be used will increase. The personal preferences
may also change over time due to learning. If the anticipated
target of an action during action observation proves to be
incorrect, the target preferences need to be updated accord-
ingly, so that subsequent inferences are more likely to be
correct. An interesting consequence is that observing another
person will change the personal preferences over time to
resemble those of the observed person.
We simulated the various likelihoods and probabilities in a
scenario where one person builds a Baufix model and the other
assists by handing over required objects. The simulations
confirm that it is possible to infer the action goal even when the
target of the movement and the associated action goal are
ambiguous. In that case the model predicts that the response
can occur before it is certain what the movement target is. If the
observer knows the desired final state, she/he will make less
errors and infer the correct action goal even if the ’evidence’
from observations favours another solution. Changing the
preferences of the components and action goals has a large
effect on the response, but the effect on the inferred action goal
is relatively small, especially if the observer does not know the
desired final state. Finally, we showed that the reaction time
will become less when the observed actor performs a
movement that conforms to the personal preferences of the
observer.
We devised our model of action observation by means of a
construction task, but it is also possible to apply it as a
framework to other tasks. For example, if we wished to model
sign language, we could replace the action goals by hand signs,
the action alternatives by the means to realise them and the
‘component(s)’ would be the person(s) to whom the sign
R.H. Cuijpers et al. / Neural Networks 19 (2006) 311–322322language was directed. The model framework then indicates
the interactions between task knowledge, personal preferences
and observations during action observation.
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